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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—SCHOOL INTEGRATION REFORM —A CALL
FOR DESEGREGATION POLICIES THAT ARE MORE THAN SKIN DEEP

I. INTRODUCTION
With race conscious desegregation laws being eliminated by judicial
decisions, how should central Arkansas schools respond to prevent a new
era of segregation? Arkansas has been home to some of the most notorious
desegregation litigation in the nation’s history. The Little Rock Nine have
been the topic of films, books, and many scholarly writings.1 Cooper v. Aaron is a staple in constitutional law books.2 Nearly fifty years have passed
since Brown v. Board of Education, yet desegregation is still on the forefront of Arkansas litigation.3
In 1989, the Little Rock School District reached a settlement agreement
that put three Pulaski County school districts under judicial supervision and
required state funding to facilitate desegregation.4 The school districts continue to receive millions of dollars under the settlement agreement; however,
recently, the Little Rock and North Little Rock School Districts were released from judicial supervision because the schools had obtained unitary
status.5 Pulaski County Special School District was not.6
1. See Ernest Green, LITTLE ROCK NINE FOUND., http://littlerock9.com/ErnestGreen.a
spx (last visited Feb. 3, 2013). After schools were ordered to desegregate in Brown v. Board
of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), Little Rock Schools attempted integration. History,
LITTLE ROCK NINE FOUND. Nine African-American students were registered to attend Little
Rock Central High. Id. Governor Orval Faubus deployed the Arkansas National Guard to
physically prevent the nine students from entering the school. Id. The U.S. Army was required to intervene and allow the students access to the school. Id.
2. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). After the decision in Brown, the Arkansas
Governor and Legislature attempted to circumvent the ruling by passing legislation to perpetuate the dual school system. Id.at 8; see also Brown, 349 U.S. at 300–01. The school board
requested that the desegregation efforts be delayed due to the resistance created by the state.
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4.The Court noted that the school board had acted in good faith, but the
deadline would not be extended due to the bad actions of the Governor and the Legislature.
Id. The most important question answered in the case was that the states were bound by the
Court’s ruling. Id. at 18.
3. See Teague ex rel. T.T. v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 873 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1069 (W.D. Ark.
2012), vacated as moot sub nom. Teague v. Cooper, 720 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding
ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-206 (f)(1) unconstitutional); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 664
F.3d 738, 748 (8th Cir. 2011) (declaring the North Little Rock School District unitary).
4. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 921 F.2d 1371, 1376
(8th Cir. 1990).
5. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 664 F.3d at 748. “[A] school district has achieved ‘unitary
status’ when it is devoid of racial discrimination with regard to: (1) student assignment; (2)
faculty and staff; (3) transportation; (4) extracurricular activities; and (5) facilities.” Little
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As a result of the districts’ unitary status, Little Rock and North Little
Rock schools are neither under a court order to desegregate, nor are they
constitutionally required to continue integration. Ironically, as a result of its
denial of unitary status, Pulaski County School District can still receive state
funds under the agreement. In short, regardless of the school’s status under
the settlement agreement, none of the Pulaski County school districts have
an incentive to continue integration efforts.
Is the Arkansas education system being held hostage by the unintended
consequences of state intervention,7 or has Arkansas simply failed to tap
new resources? This note argues that the 1989 Settlement Agreement and
other race-conscious measures are an outdated way to protect equality interests in the educational system and recommends a new form of integration in
Pulaski County’s public schools: socioeconomic redistricting. This note
suggests that parents, educators, and administrators in Pulaski County have
the opportunity to encourage new legislation that factors more than race into
the equality equation.
First, this note will discuss recent rulings by the Supreme Court of the
United States and the impact that the law has on Arkansas’s educational
system.8 Next, the note will discuss the 1989 Settlement Agreement and
other state laws aimed at Arkansas schools.9 Part III will discuss how socioeconomic redistricting is a race-neutral alternative that will not only improve the quality of education, but also improve diversity within each school
district.10
Education equality has been and will forever be the focus of parents
and legislatures.11 In Arkansas, it seems radical to discuss education policies
that do not focus on race because of the deeply-rooted history of segregation. Across the nation, however, the focus has shifted to the new concern of
wealth disparities.12 The emerging issue in equality is not limited to what

Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1000 (E.D. Ark.
2002) aff’d sub nom. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Armstrong, 359 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2004).
North Little Rock School District is completely unitary, while Pulaski County Special School
District is unitary in all but nine areas. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 664 F.3d at 748.
6. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 664 F.3d at 748.
7. See Aaron J. Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495, 504
(2010) (“Since the United States began to enforce the prohibition on de jure school segregation, the territorially sovereign district, . . . has been a preeminent tool for resisting the racial
integration of schools.”).
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part III.
11. The plethora of case law regarding segregation and the movement to school finance
litigation shows the continued demand to “equalize the distribution of educational resources.”
James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 252 (1999).
12. Education and Socioeconomic Status, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N., http://www.apa.
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skin color a person is born with, but concerns how many opportunities a
person’s wealth affords him or her.13 The desegregation policies created half
a century ago can be updated and improved to address the new hurdle to
providing equality in Arkansas education.
II. BACKGROUND
Although school policies are thought of as purely a local matter, equal
access to education is a constitutional right.14 As the Supreme Court of the
United States declared fifty years ago, “[I]n the field of public education the
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”15 Yet, in the years following
that clear statement, the Supreme Court has had to revisit the topic of segregation multiple times.16 Suddenly, what seemed to be a simple order to integrate became a complex set of constitutional rights and remedies.17 To propose an effective and legal change to central Arkansas school policies, one
must be mindful of 1) the constitutional requirements and limitations; and 2)
the current settlement agreement between the Little Rock, North Little
Rock, and Pulaski County Special School Districts.

org/pi/ses/resources/publications/factsheet-education.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2013). “Inequities in wealth distribution, resource distribution, and quality of life are increasing in the
United States and globally.” Id.
13. See Kelley Holland, Class System? When It Comes to School Aid, Rich Have the
Edge, CNBC (Aug. 1, 2013, 5:55 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100930851. The article
notes that because students from more affluent backgrounds have better chances of obtaining
scholarships, “‘the nation’s public and private four-year colleges and universities are in danger of shutting down what has long been a pathway to the middle class’. . . .” Id.
14. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1958). In a later case, the Court reiterated that
“[s]chool authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement
educational policy,” but if school authorities have a duty to desegregate “judicial authority
may be invoked.” Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1971).
15. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) [hereinafter Brown I]. A year
following that ruling the Supreme Court ordered schools begin integration with “all deliberate speed.” Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) [hereinafter Brown II].
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. Some schools districts have been litigating the Court’s ruling for nearly fifty years.
See infra Part II.B. The Supreme Court has heard either school segregation or an affirmative
action case every decade since Brown I’s ruling. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133
S.Ct. 2411 (2013); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267 (1986); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391
U.S. 430 (1968).
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The Constitutional Requirements of Desegregation

In Brown I, the Court set out to eliminate segregated or dual school
systems.18 To achieve this goal, the Supreme Court ordered that the state has
an affirmative duty to create a unitary system;19 however, the Court limited
the states’ attempts to integrate in three key ways.20 First, a state is required
to remedy only segregation caused by state action.21 Second, the remedy is
limited to the district where the violation occurred.22 Finally, when a state
uses a race-based remedy to combat segregation, the remedy must survive a
strict scrutiny analysis.23
1.

Limits Based on State Action

A state is obligated to remedy past segregation only if it is caused by
state action, often referred to by the courts as de jure segregation.24 De jure
segregation can mean a statutory scheme that created a dual school system,
or it can mean action by the state or school board that has “(1) a racially
discriminatory purpose and (2) a causal relationship between the acts complained of and the racial imbalance.”25 School districts have no duty to correct segregation caused by the free choices made by the citizens of that
state.26 This type of segregation is called de facto segregation.27
Although de facto segregation is caused by many factors,28 the key distinction between it and de jure segregation is that de facto segregation cannot be attributed to “discriminatory action of state authorities.”29 For exam18. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495; Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 (stating that “[t]he objective today
remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.”).
19. Green, 391 U.S. at 437 (“School boards . . . operating state-compelled dual systems
were . . . charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch.”).
20. See infra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
21. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 189.
22. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 717–18 (1974).
23. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007).
24. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 189.
25. Id. at 207. The Constitutional inquiry of whether the state has committed de jure
segregation is a district-by-district analysis; however, if a plaintiff shows intentional segregative actions in a “meaningful portion of a school system,” then a burden shifting presumption
is created. Id. at 208. The school board will have the burden of proving other districts were
not victim to intentional segregation. Id.
26. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1971).
27. Id.
28. Segregation can be caused by “‘housing patterns, employment practices, economic
conditions, and social attitudes.’” Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 760 (quoting the dissent, id.
at 838–39 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
29. Swann, 402 U.S. at 18.
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ple, state action can include structuring attendance zones on the basis of race
or building fixed-size schools located in African American residential areas
to influence the racial composition of the schools, but does not include the
existence of a single race school due to neighborhood residential patterns.30
Without some type of state action, courts are not permitted to order remedies
for segregated schools.31
2.

School District Boundary Limits

Once a school is shown to have suffered from the effects of de jure segregation,32 the remedy must be limited to the scope of the violation.33 The
Court uses school district boundaries as a guideline to define the scope of
the remedy.34 Violations that occur within a school district, intra-district
violations, require intra-district remedies.35 The Court chose school district
boundaries as a guideline to avoid the logistical concerns of restructuring
many different schools and to maintain the benefits of providing local control.36
For example, in Michigan, the state faced the problem of segregation in
Detroit’s inner-city school districts.37 The state created attendance zones that
encompassed newly created suburban school districts to remedy the segregation.38 The plan called for the consolidation of fifty-four school districts into

30. Id. at 20–21, 25.
31. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205–06 (1973).
32. Swann, 402 U.S. at 18. “[E]xisting policy and practice with regard to faculty, staff,
transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities were among the most important indicia
of a segregated system.” Id.
33. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974).
34. Id. The Court found school district lines significant because the boundary lines were
not a creation of mere convenience, but a “deeply rooted tradition” that cannot be ignored. Id.
at 719, 741–42.
35. Id. at 744.
36. Id. at 743. The benefits of local control include “afford[ing] citizens an opportunity
to participate in decision-making, permit[ting] the structuring of school programs to fit local
needs, and encourag[ing] ‘experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence.’” Id. at 742 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 50 (1973)). In contrast, the Court noted that a multidistrict plan did not address matters
related to the status and operation of the current school board, taxes, and large scale transportation needs. Id. at 743.
37. Id. at 729–30. The problem of segregation between districts rather than within was
more common place in the northern metropolitan schools, where school districts were drawn
based on smaller municipalities rather than large counties. Dana Russo, Note, School Desegregation: From Topeka, Kansas to Wake County, North Carolina—Changing the Path, but
Staying the Course, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 535, 538 (2012).
38. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 730 (calling the solution an “implementation of a multidistrict,
metropolitan area remedy”).
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a “vast new super school district.”39 The Court found the plan unconstitutional.40 Although inner-city districts suffered from the effects of de jure
segregation, the suburban districts, being newly created, did not have a history of de jure segregation.41 Ultimately, the Court limited when the state
may undertake large scale reforms by finding that a multidistrict remedy
was appropriate only when a constitutional violation in one district causes a
“significant segregative effect in another district.”42
3.

Limits of Strict Scrutiny

When the state creates a law based on race, the Court determines
whether the law is constitutional using a strict scrutiny standard.43 In education cases, states have often used remedies that utilize individualized, racebased classifications to combat segregation.44 Although this is an affirmative
effort to integrate, the strict scrutiny standard is applied regardless of whether the plan seeks to include or exclude.45 The Court will even use a strict
scrutiny analysis on a race-neutral law, but only if the Court finds that the
law has a racially discriminatory purpose.46
In order to pass strict scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling government interest.47 In education cases, the Court has recognized only two interests as compelling.48 First, remedying de jure segregation is a compelling government interest that was established by the Brown I
decision and the litigation that followed.49 The second recognized interest is
39. Id. at 743.
40. Id. at 745.
41. Id.
42. Id. The Court did note that “an interdistrict remedy might be in order where the
racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an
adjacent district, or where district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race.” Id.
However, this was not the case in Detroit. The suburban schools districts were not causing
the segregation in the inner-city schools. Id. The creation of the suburban school districts was
not a result of purposeful state action, but more likely because of residential patterns, or de
facto segregation. Id.
43. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). In equal protection cases the Court
uses a more “searching judicial scrutiny.” Id. The analysis has a reputation for disfavoring the
state so much that the phrase “strict in theory, but fatal in fact” has been quoted time and time
again by the Court. See id.
44. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720
(2007).
45. Id.
46. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599–600 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (“A statute, otherwise neutral on its face,
must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race”).
47. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720.
48. See infra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
49. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720.
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achieving diversity.50 If the state demonstrates that it has a compelling interest, the law must still be narrowly tailored to fit that interest.51 Narrow tailoring requires a “serious, good faith consideration of workable, race-neutral
alternatives.”52
The Court recognizes that the state has a compelling interest in remedying past discrimination.53 When a school is declared unitary, however, the
school no longer can use race-based efforts to remedy de jure discrimination.54 While recognizing that the state has an affirmative duty to act, the
Court held that once the school is unitary, the use of individualized racebased classifications can no longer be justified.55
For example, the Jefferson County school district in Lexington, Kentucky was once under a court decree to desegregate.56 After achieving unitary status, the school district implemented a race-based plan that required
minimum minority enrollment that prohibited transfers of certain students
on the basis of racial guidelines.57 The Court found the plan unconstitutional, and the school was prohibited from using it, even though one year prior,
the school district was required to maintain policies to desegregate the
schools.58
The only other compelling interest the Court has found is achieving diversity.59 The Court held constitutional a law school’s policy that used race
as a factor in admission.60 This holding, although limited to higher education
by the Court, has been applied to primary and secondary schools.61 Although
50. Id. at 722. This interest is limited both in scope and in longevity. See infra notes 59–
69 and accompanying text.
51. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720.
52. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003). A district court in Arkansas found a
law that limited school transfer based on the race of the student had a compelling interest, but
was unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored. Teague ex rel. T.T. v. Ark. Bd. of
Educ., 873 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1069 (W.D. Ark. 2012), vacated as moot sub nom. Teague v.
Cooper, 720 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2013). The court called the law a “blanket rule” that used only
race as a criteria. Id. at 1066. The court stated the law must “employ a more nuanced, individualized evaluation of the school and student needs” in order to be narrowly tailored. Id. at
1068.
53. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720. This is referred to above as de jure segregation.
54. Id. at 720–21.
55. Id. at 721.
56. Id. at 720–21.
57. Id. at 716.
58. Id. at 747–48.
59. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
60. Id. at 343. This matter was recently heard by the Supreme Court. Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (vacating and remanding to the Court of Appeals due
to an incorrect application of strict scrutiny).
61. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 725 (“The Court in Grutter expressly articulated key
limitations on its holding—defining a specific type of broad-based diversity and noting the
unique context of higher education . . . .”). Although this ruling was limited to higher educa-
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this decision has been applied beyond the scope the Court imposed, the expansive application of Grutter v. Bollinger may be short lived.62
In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,63 the University of Texas’s
admission plan automatically admitted students that graduated in the top ten
percent of their high school class.64 The rest of the applicants were evaluated
with a process that considered race as one of many factors to encourage diversity among admitted students.65 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found
the plan constitutional as a matter of law by applying strict scrutiny, while
being “mindful of a university’s academic freedom.”66
The Petitioner appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court,
and many anticipated that Grutter v. Bollinger67 would be overturned, thus
eliminating diversity as a compelling interest.68 The Court remanded the
case back for a strict scrutiny review that is not “strict in theory but feeble in
fact,”69 emphasizing the need for close analysis of race-conscious plans.70
Though the Court declined to overrule Grutter because the parties did not
ask the Court to do so,71 the opinion left open the possibility that future reliance on race-conscious plans would be improvident.72

tion in Parents Involved, federal district courts have used the Grutter reasoning in cases regarding primary schools. See Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, New York Sch. Dist. No.
21, 536 F. Supp. 2d 274, 283 (E.D. N.Y. 2008). Judge Jack Weinstein wrote in the opinion,
“[t]he same considerations that permit race as one factor among many that may be considered
in college and graduate schools under Grutter . . . should be applied to grade schools . . . .”
Id.
62. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (“There is disagreement about whether Grutter was consistent with the principles of equal protection in
approving this compelling interest in diversity.”).
63. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
64. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 235 (5th Cir. 2011) cert. granted,
132 S. Ct. 1536, (2012) and vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
65. Id. at 235–36.
66. Id. at 234.
67. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
68. Lyle Denniston, Opinion recap: More rigorous race review, SCOTUSBLOG, (June
24, 2013, 1:39 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/opinion-recap-more-rigorous-racereview/.
69. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421.
Once the University has established that its goal of diversity is consistent with
strict scrutiny, however, there must still be a further judicial determination that
the admissions process meets strict scrutiny in its implementation. The University must prove that the means chosen by the University to attain diversity are narrowly tailored to that goal. On this point, the University receives no deference.
Id. at 2419–20.
70. Id. at 2419.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 2422. (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I would overrule [Grutter], and hold that
a State’s use of race in higher education admissions decisions is categorically prohibited by
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Desegregation in Arkansas

After the Supreme Court of the United States ordered integration in
Brown I, the Arkansas government resisted desegregation.73 In 1956, the
Arkansas Constitution was amended to oppose the desegregation decisions
made by the Supreme Court.74 The Supreme Court ruled that state officials
must obey judicial orders.75 The Little Rock schools allowed minority students to enter, but the resistance to integration continued until the 1980s.76
Thirty years of ineffective efforts and resistance culminated in a federal lawsuit between the Little Rock, North Little Rock, and Pulaski County Special
School Districts.77
1.

The 1989 Settlement Agreement

Despite many efforts to maintain integrated schools, Little Rock
schools suffered from “severe financial problems and an eroding financial
base.”78 The Little Rock School District complained that school district
boundaries were purposely maintained to prevent integration— while the
city grew,79 the school district did not.80 Attractive residential areas that
counted as part of the city of Little Rock were not included in the city’s

the Equal Protection Clause.”); Denniston, supra note 68 (“[T]he tone of the opinion would
seem to invite such further testing” of race-conscious plans.).
73. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404, 413
(8th Cir. 1985).
74. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1958). The state opposed desegregation by “‘enacting laws, calling out troops, making statements vilifying federal law and federal courts,
and failing to utilize state law enforcement agencies and judicial processes to maintain public
peace.’” Id. at 15 (quoting Brief for Petitioner, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)). Little
Rock schools, both majority and minority, were closed completely for a year. Little Rock Sch.
Dist., 778 F.2d at 415. The state even passed legislation to garner funding for litigating its
position in opposing integration. Id. at 414.
75. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18. The Eighth Circuit summed up Cooper’s holding by stating
that “public opposition to desegregation of the races, no matter how deeply entrenched, could
not be allowed to interfere with the full realization of the constitutional rights of black citizens.” Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 921 F.2d 1371, 1376
(8th Cir. 1990).
76. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 778 F.2d at 417.
77. See id. These three districts are located in Pulaski County Arkansas, the state’s most
populous county. Id. at 408.
78. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1000
(E.D. Ark. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Armstrong, 359 F.3d 957 (8th Cir.
2004).
79. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 778 F.2d at 419.
80. Id. (noting that at that time had the district grown as the city “the black-white ratio in
the Little Rock schools would now be sixty-forty rather than seventy-thirty.”).
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school district, but rather in Pulaski County Special School District.81 Additionally, Pulaski County closed minority schools and built newer schools in
suburban areas that were remote and inaccessible to minority students.82
The litigation revealed not only purposeful blocks to integration, but
also a disturbing trend of minority students receiving grossly inadequate
educational opportunities.83 In the pre-Brown I era, per pupil expenditures in
minority schools were significantly less than other schools.84 Post Brown I,
segregated county schools received more state aid than city schools.85 Integrated schools were more likely to label minority students as learning disabled, and less likely to offer extracurricular activities to minority students.86
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the school districts had
violated the law, and an inter-district remedy was warranted because the
boundary manipulation in Pulaski County “had a substantial interdistrict
segregative effect.”87 The ruling was highly contested,88 but finally, the
schools consented to a plan the court termed the 1989 Settlement Agreement.89 The court considered the plan to be a “complete cure for all interdistrict violations.”90 The agreement would allow school administrators to focus on education—not litigation.91
The Settlement Agreement focused on the creation of magnet schools,
voluntary transfers, and state funding.92 The districts agreed that Pulaski
County Special School District would create two types of magnet schools.93
The first would be a school that enrolled minority students from the Little
Rock School District and majority students from the Pulaski County District.94 The other would be themed magnet schools that would entice parents
81. Id.
82. Id. at 420.
83. Id. at 412.
84. Id. In the pre-Brown I era, Little Rock became known as the only Arkansas school
district that offered educational opportunities for minority students, prompting many minority
students to transfer to Little Rock schools. Id. at 418–19.
85. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 778 F.2d at 420.
86. Id. at 422.
87. Id. at 419 (meeting the “significant segregative effect in another district” requirement set out in Milliken).
88. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 921 F. 2d 1371,
1376 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that the ruling was followed by ten appeals.).
89. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 664 F.3d 738, 757 (8th Cir. 2011).
90. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 921 F.2d at 1377.
91. Id. at 1394.
92. Id. at 1379–80.
93. Id. at 1379. “‘[M]agnet schools,’ . . . as their name suggests, aim to provide such
improved educational quality that whites as well as blacks will be drawn to attend them.”
Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 728, 763 (1986).
94. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 921 F.2d at 1379.
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of all races to enroll their students because of the schools’ special offerings.95 The plan allowed the district to convert some of the non-magnet
schools into “incentive schools” that would be comprised of nearly all minority students, but would receive “special compensatory-education programs and markedly increased amounts of money.”96
In addition to the creation of magnet schools, the plan also allowed for
voluntary school choice, which allowed students to transfer into the school
district of their choice.97 The agreement gave control of the school’s integration efforts to the judicial branch.98 Finally, the plan would require the state
to pay over $100 million to the schools over a ten-year period.99
2.

Current Status

In order to be released from the Settlement Agreement, the schools
must petition the court.100 The court reviews several key areas of the Settlement Agreement and decides if the school has reasonably complied with the
agreement.101 Currently, the Little Rock School District is unitary,102 and the
North Little Rock School District has been declared unitary in all areas as
well.103 Pulaski County Special School District is unitary in all areas but
nine.104
Currently, the state continues to pay $38 million per year to the three
districts to fund the schools’ desegregation efforts.105 Arkansas has made
clear that unitary schools would no longer receive this type of funding.106 In
2011, a federal district court released the state from its funding obligation,
but the appellate court reversed.107 The trial court noted that the additional
funding could encourage school districts to delay integration.108 Although
95. Id. at 1389.
96. Id. at 1379.
97. Id.
98. Id. at1383.
99. Id. at 1381.
100. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 664 F.3d 738, 744 (8th Cir. 2011).
101. Id.
102. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. N. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 561 F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 2009).
103. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 664 F.3d at 744–48 (reversing the trial court’s decision to
deny unitary status in the area of staff recruitment to North Little Rock).
104. Id. at 748–57.
105. Id. at 757.
106. Id.
107. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v.Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., No. 4:82cv00866 BSM,
2011 WL 1935332, at *54 (E.D. Ark. May 19, 2011), rev’d in part sub nom. Little Rock Sch.
Dist. v. Arkansas, 664 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2011).
108. Id. The trial court referred to the funding as using the “carrot and stick approach . . .
but that the districts are wise mules that have learned how to eat the carrot and sit down on
the job.” Id.
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the appellate court reinstated the funding, the court agreed that the funding
created a “perverse incentive[]” to not integrate.109
In 2013, the Arkansas Legislature repealed the Arkansas Public School
Choice Act of 1989110 after a district court found the law unconstitutional.111
The original law provided students an opportunity to transfer to the district
of their choice as long as the students did not move from a district where
their race was the minority to a district where their race was the majority.112
The court applied strict scrutiny because the law used race as a remedy.113
The court found the state had a compelling interest in remedying past discrimination but overturned the law because it was not narrowly tailored.114
The Arkansas legislature reacted by passing a law that does not use a student’s race when approving transfers, but does exclude school districts from
transfers if those districts are under a desegregation order, like the Settlement Agreement.115 Accordingly, because it has not obtained unitary status,116 students in the Pulaski County Special School District do not have the
option to transfer to the school of their choice.
III.

ARGUMENT

As one commenter noted, “[i]n spite of more than a century of activism
seeking equal schooling for African American children, America’s schools
remain substantially segregated and unequal.”117 Integration has failed for
many reasons, both legal and social. The reasons for the impact of failed
integration are tied to funding and educational quality, race and poverty, and
the fact that schools are under no obligation to remedy all types of segrega109. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 664 F.3d at 758.
110. Schools and School Districts—Public School Choice Act of 2013, 2013 Ark. Acts
1227 (2013) (repealing ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-206 (2007)).
111. Teague ex rel. T.T. v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 873 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1069 (W.D. Ark.
2012), vacated as moot sub nom. Teague v. Cooper, 720 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2013).
112. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-206 (f)(1) (2007) (repealed 2013).
113. Teague, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.
114. Id. at 1066.
115. 2013 Ark. Acts 1227 at sec. 6 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-18-1901 to -1909
(Supp. 2013)).
116. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1000
(E.D. Ark. 2002) aff’d sub nom. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Armstrong, 359 F.3d 957 (8th Cir.
2004).
117. Molly Townes O’Brien, Desegregation and the Struggle for Equal Schooling: Rolling the Rock of Sisyphus, in OUR PROMISE: ACHIEVING EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY FOR
AMERICA’S CHILDREN 3, 23 (Maurice R. Dyson & Daniel B. Weddle eds., 2009). “[M]any
schools—especially those located in urban communities—are more segregated today than
they were prior to the Brown v. Board of Education decision.” Eboni S. Nelson, The Availability and Viability of Socioeconomic Integration Post-Parents Involved, 59 S.C. L. REV. 841,
841–42 (2008).
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tion.118 The solution to the problem of quality education in the Little Rock,
North Little Rock, and Pulaski County Special School Districts is to implement socioeconomic redistricting.
A.

Integration Plateaus

The Supreme Court’s limitation on legal remedies and voluntary desegregation plans has resulted in the re-segregation of many American cities.119
As time passes, the vestiges of state-created segregation have almost been
eliminated, yet the country continues to have racially isolated schools.120
Schools across the country have become more segregated, not because of
state action, but because of de facto segregation.121 The combined effect has
led one commenter to note that “[m]andatory racial desegregation has almost run its course.”122
Due to legal limits on when a state may combat segregation, wealthier
families have the option to avoid integrated schools simply by moving to the
suburbs where dual systems never existed, but low socioeconomic classes
and minorities are not represented.123 Accordingly, inner-city schools are left
with high concentrations of low-income minority students while the suburbs
are home to wealthier, segregated schools. 124
118. See infra Part IV.A–B.
119. Osamudia R. James, Closing the Door on Public School Integration: Parents Involved and the Supreme Court’s Continued Neglect of Adequacy Concerns, in OUR PROMISE:
ACHIEVING EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY FOR AMERICA’S CHILDREN 215, 215 (Maurice R. Dyson
& Daniel B. Weddle eds., 2009).
120. Gary Orfield, Segregated Housing and School Resegregation, in DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 291, 294 (Gary
Orfield, Susan E. Eaton, & Harvard Project on School Desegregation, eds., 1996) [hereinafter
Orfield, Segregated Housing] (“Even where extensive desegregation was achieved under an
old court order, racial integration was threatened by the spread of minority segregation in city
neighborhoods and the continuous construction of new all-white suburbs.”).
121. Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 374 (2012) (“Schools are as racially segregated today as they were four decades ago . . . .”). In the Parents Involved decision, Justice
Kennedy in a concurring opinion feared the plurality was ignoring the impact of de facto
segregation in school districts. 551 U.S. 701, 788 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
122. Black, supra note 121, at 374.
123. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 87 (1995) (noting the Court does not find a violation just because of a racial imbalance in a school without a showing of something more); see
Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1545, 1551
(2007) [hereinafter Kahenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration]. Kahlenberg argues that
this view is acceptable to society because of the “deeply held notion that wealthy parents
have a right to purchase homes in affluent neighborhoods and send their children to public
schools that in effect exclude less well-off children.” Id.
124. Ryan, supra note 11, at 272. “Roughly two-thirds of black students attend elementary and secondary school in central-city districts.” Id.
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Social influences have contributed to re-segregation as well. Patterns in
housing have become less integrated.125 Economic factors affect minorities’
ability to purchase homes in more affluent areas, which has impacted the
demographic makeup of neighborhoods.126 African Americans face disadvantages in receiving loans to purchase homes in wealthier neighborhoods.127 Furthermore, African Americans suffer from an income gap that
affects their ability to build the assets required for social mobility.128 Since
many school districts rely on neighborhood districts,129 the outcome is simple: if we live segregated, we learn segregated.
The judicial system has avoided regulating all causes of residential segregation.130 The Supreme Court has referred to the phenomenon as a product
of “demographic forces” rather than addressing the historical impact of segregation that has fostered the current demographic makeup of the country.131
One author has gone so far as criticizing the court’s decisions for “enshrin[ing] ‘choice,’ for those who can afford it, and deem[ing] marginalization or exclusion acceptable for the less fortunate other.”132 Another explanation, however, may be that the courts have been reluctant to challenge de
facto segregation because of the implications of finding a legal harm in racial isolation itself, rather than in the state’s action of segregating students.133
Even though schools still suffer from segregation, administrators are
restricted in the voluntary use of integration plans. The state has no constitu125. Orfield, Segregated Housing, supra note 120, at 291.
126. John A. Powell & Rebecca High, The Common Schools Democracy Requires: Expanding Membership through Inclusive Education, in LESSONS IN INTEGRATION: REALIZING
THE PROMISE OF RACIAL DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 265, 269–70 (Erica Frankenberg &
Gary Orfield eds., 2007).
127. See id.
128. Id. at 269.
129. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, supra note 123, at 1569 (noting
“roughly three quarters of American students attend neighborhood public schools”).
130. Orfield, Segregated Housing, supra note 120, at 292–95. See also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 96 (1995) (“The record here does not support the District Court’s reliance
on ‘white flight’ as a justification for a permissible expansion of its intradistrict remedial
authority through its pursuit of desegregative attractiveness”).
131. Orfield, Segregated Housing, supra note 120, at 296–97. Orfield refers to the patterns in housing as a “residential apartheid.” Id. at 299.
132. Powell & High, supra note 126, at 270. Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell voiced
a similar sentiment in his concurring opinion in the Keyes decision. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189, 219 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell stated “if our national concern is for those who attend [segregated] schools, rather than for
perpetuating a legalism rooted in history rather than present reality, we must recognize that
the evil of operating separate schools is no less in Denver than in Atlanta.” Id.
133. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 115 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). In his
concurring opinion, Justice Thomas made clear that findings of harm in a racially isolated
school rest on the assumption that a predominantly minority school is inferior. Id. at 114–15.
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tional duty to combat de facto segregation.134 If a state does endeavor to address segregation, any state law using race will be tested with strict scrutiny.135 Because the only compelling interest likely to pass strict scrutiny is
combating de jure segregation, a school can only combat segregation by
using race is if the district is constitutionally required to eliminate the segregation. Exacerbating the problem is the fact that even when inner-city districts can prove a de jure violation, the city may not be able to actually combat the segregation in a meaningful way.136
In Arkansas, the legal impact has been significant. More of Arkansas’s
schools have become unitary.137 Such schools, therefore, may not make efforts to integrate using race-based criteria under Supreme Court precedent.138 Even Arkansas’s Public School Choice Law was found unconstitutional under the strict scrutiny standard.139 Each decision points to the conclusion that the use of race in Arkansas school legislation is coming to an
end, but problems of segregation still exist.
B.

The Impact of Isolation

Minority students suffer disproportionately from the effects of racial
isolation. Although wealth disparities in general have grown, race and poverty are especially linked.140 In Pulaski County Special School District’s
effort to attain unitary status, the district had to demonstrate its efforts to
implement a plan to address the achievement gap of African-American students.141 The district presented evidence that any plan would be futile be134. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Although under no affirmative duty to desegregate in a de facto
area, Justice Kennedy argued it is a mistake that “[schools] must accept the status quo of
racial isolation . . . .” Id.
135. See supra Part II.A.3.
136. Orfield, Segregated Housing, supra note 120, at 294. Orfield writes about the impact
of the Milliken ruling on the Detroit School District noting that “Detroit was the nation’s
second most segregated metropolitan area a generation after [the post Milliken remedy was
instated].” Id.
137. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 664 F.3d 738, 758 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding
North Little Rock School District unitary).
138. See supra Part II.
139. Teague ex rel T.T. v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 873 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1069 (W.D. Ark.
2012), vacated as moot sub nom. Teague v. Cooper, 720 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2013).
140. Black, supra note 121, at 404. Black notes the achievement gap between minority
and majority students is the equivalent of two or three grade years; however, “[r]esearch
indicates that much of this achievement gap is not based on race itself, but is largely attributable to the fact that predominately minority schools are also overwhelmingly high-poverty
schools . . . .” Id.
141. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1023
(E.D. Ark. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Armstrong, 359 F.3d 957 (8th Cir.
2004).

138

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

cause “the current socioeconomic differences between African-Americans
and whites make it impossible to eliminate the achievement gap.”142 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district’s failure to implement a plan aimed solely at African American students warranted a denial of
unitary status.143 The court required the school to make a good faith effort to
implement a plan targeted at race, “regardless of whether [the plan] eventually bear[s] fruit.”144
Furthermore, segregated schools are more likely to be low-income
schools.145 One author noted that minorities made up “80 percent of all students in schools with poverty rates of 90 percent or more.”146 Low income
schools have lower test scores, higher drop-out rates, lower parental involvement, fewer connections to higher education, and lower quality teacher
retention.147 The lack of experienced qualified teachers plagues lower income schools.148 Families are less likely to have the finances for academic
support.149 As a result, minorities suffer far more from the harmful effects of
segregation.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has acknowledged the impact of high
poverty schools, and the Legislature has addressed the issue through increased funding.150 The Legislature enacted bills that provided incentives for
teachers to relocate to areas with high concentrations of poverty.151 In addition, the General Assembly increased school funding by nearly 18% through
increased taxes in order to provide all Arkansas students with an adequate

142. Id. at 1073.
143. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 664 F.3d 738, 756–57 (8th Cir. 2011).
144. Id. at 757.
145. Powell & High, supra note 126, at 269.
146. Id. at 270; see also Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, supra note 123,
at 1545. “Minority students are almost three times as likely as white students to be lowincome.” Id.
147. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration through Public School
Choice: A Progressive Alternative to Vouchers, 45 HOW. L.J. 247, 250–52 (2002) [hereinafter
Kahlenberg, Public School Choice].
148. One study showed that in low-income schools 27% of the math teachers actually
majored in mathematics compared to 43% in middle income schools. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASS’N., supra note 12.
149. Id. This page notes that studies show a correlation between availability of books,
computers, tutors and literacy. Id.
150. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 358 Ark. 137, 141–42, 189 S.W.3d 1, 4
(2004). The Court appointed special Masters to evaluate a study on what resources were
required to provide an adequate education. Id. at 142, 189 S.W.3d at 4. The Masters recommended additional staff for schools with high concentrations of poverty and measures to
prevent teachers from migrating from poorer districts. Id. at 146, 148, 189 S.W.3d at 4, 8.
151. Id. at 148, 189 S.W.3d at 8. Though an improvement, the Masters questioned whether the measures would enable poorer school districts to compete with wealthier districts or
districts in neighboring states. Id. at 158, 189 S.W.3d at 14.
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education.152 In assessing the effectiveness of the legislation, the court was
clear that the measures were an effort not to equalize schools, but to establish a floor each school must meet.153
C.

Socioeconomic Redistricting as a Solution

Previous methods for dealing with racial segregation are outdated.154
Race conscious measures are disfavored by the court, and in Arkansas, the
“carrot and stick approach” has yielded poor results.155 Great benefits, however, can be derived from the continuation of integration. In his concurring
opinion in Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy said that the plurality’s holding “should not prevent school districts from continuing the important work
of bringing together students of different racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds.”156 To combat the effects of re-segregation and improve educational opportunities for students of all races, Pulaski County school districts
should implement a race-neutral action plan.
Socioeconomic redistricting would be a constitutional method of
providing much needed resources to low-income schools and would indirectly integrate schools suffering from de facto segregation. Although other
schools have used alternative race-neutral approaches, this note proposes
152. Id. at 153, 189 S.W.3d at 12.
153. Id. at 155, 189 S.W.3d at 13. The Court noted that some school districts may be able
to raise additional funds “which may lead to enhanced curricula, facilities, and equipment
[that] are superior to what is deemed to be adequate by the State.” Id. The goal of achieving
equity and adequacy has been a key distinction in school finance litigation across the nation.
See William A. Kaplin, Fiscal Inequity and Resegregation: Two Pressing Mutual Concerns
of K-12 Education and Higher Education, in OUR PROMISE ACHIEVING EDUCATIONAL
EQUALITY FOR AMERICA’S CHILDREN 99, 106 (Maurice R. Dyson & Daniel B. Weddle eds.,
2009).
154. See Susan E. Eaton, Slipping Toward Segregation: Local Control and Eroding Desegregation in Montgomery County, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION THE QUIET REVERSAL
OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 207, 222 (Gary Orfield, Susan E. Eaton, & Harvard Project on School Desegregation, eds., 1996) Studies have shown that magnet schools, like the
ones created in Little Rock, are not powerful enough to draw in voluntary transfers and could
actually work against desegregation. Id. See also Alison Morantz, Money and Choice in
Kansas City: Major Investments with Modest Returns, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION THE
QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 241, 243 (Gary Orfield, Susan E. Eaton,
& Harvard Project on School Desegregation, eds., 1996) (explaining that voluntary magnet
schools achieved only modest advances in academic achievement and racial segregation).
155. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 664 F.3d 738, 752 (8th Cir. 2011). In 2005,
Pulaski County Special School District opened a new elementary school in a predominately
African-American area. The cost of the facility broke down to roughly $8,150 per student. Id.
Compare that to the $25,000 per student cost of a school district that opened seven years later
in a predominately white area. Id.
156. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 798 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
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that the best solution would be to redistrict schools with high concentrations
of low-income students with suburban middle-class schools.
1.

Passing the Legal Requirements

Socioeconomic redistricting is a constitutional way to achieve integration and the benefits of better financed schools. Race-based systems are
tested by strict scrutiny,157 but socioeconomic redistricting would focus on
race-neutral criteria such as the number of students on free lunches158 or
census data.159 If the law has the race-neutral purpose of achieving integration of middle and low-income children,160 the court will find the law constitutional as long as there is a rational basis for the law.161 Adequate resources
are rationally related to how well schools perform,162 and redistricting to get
those resources in all schools is a legitimate way to achieve the goal considering that the continuation of low income schools is economically inefficient.163
While it is true that the redistricting would necessarily cross the district
boundaries in Pulaski County, socioeconomic redistricting would not be
limited by the intra-district rule in Milliken164 because the plan would still
pass constitutional muster.165 First, the purpose of redistricting is to better
finance the county’s schools, not to remedy past segregation.166 Since the
plan is not remedial action combating a violation, the limitation of Milliken
would not apply. Second, even if the rule did apply, the Eighth Circuit Court
157. See supra Part II.A.3.
158. When a school is segregated due to de facto segregation, the school must use racially
neutral means to combat the wrong unless there is some extraordinary showing. Parents
Involved, 551 U.S. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
159. Black, supra note 121, at 414; see AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N., supra note 12 (Socioeconomic status can be measured “as a combination of education, income and occupation.”).
160. Gewirtz, supra note 93, at 773 (stating “educational improvements are relevant in
their own right, because they also promote a separate remedial goal”).
161. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
162. Kahlenberg, Public School Choice, supra note 147, at 250 (“Successful schools
require an adequate financial base.”).
163. Black, supra note 121, at 411 (“The federal government estimates that the cost of
educating low-income students is approximately forty percent more than middle-income
students.”).
164. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
165. See Gary Orfield, Toward an Integrated Future: New Directions for Courts, Educators, Civil Rights Groups, Policymakers, and Scholars, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION:
THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 331, 345 (Gary Orfield, Susan E.
Eaton, & Harvard Project on School Desegregation, eds., 1996) [hereinafter Orfield, Toward
an Integrated Future] (“The most stable desegregation plans are plans that include cities and
suburbs.”).
166. Integration is a secondary benefit of the plan, not the purpose.
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has already determined that significant intra-district violations had occurred
between the three districts in Pulaski County, so the scope of this plan
would be permitted.167
Furthermore, Arkansas law could provide a basis for the plan. The statutory law allows for the consolidation of districts that are not geographically
contiguous if it will result “in the overall improvement of the educational
benefit to students in all of the districts involved.”168 Although the Supreme
Court of the United States has held that an adequate education is not a fundamental right,169 some scholars have suggested that allowing students access to adequate resources such as middle-class peers is required by the state
constitution.170
Arkansas courts have found that children are entitled to adequate resources.171 Socioeconomic redistricting could be argued as a way to adequately fund Arkansas’s schools.172 Recently, a new wave of litigation has
focused on the entitlement of adequate education as a way to improve education in poor, racially isolated districts.173 If redistricting fails to pass legal
concerns regarding segregation laws, a strong argument can be made that
the change is required under state law.174
2.

Producing Integration and Improvement in Education

Redistricting Pulaski County schools would bring additional resources
to the schools while indirectly addressing the harmful impacts of segregation. The change would increase resources by providing a range of lowincome and middle-income students to each school district.175 Creating mid167. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 921 F.2d 1371, 1377
(8th Cir. 1990).
168. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-13-1404(f)(1) (Repl. 2007 & Supp. 2013).
169. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
170. Ryan, supra note 11, at 259. “Whereas school desegregation cases sought equality
indirectly through integration, school finance cases directly attacked the apparent source of
the inequality: the distribution of education resources.” Id.
171. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 358 Ark. 137, 155, 189 S.W.3d 1, 12–13
(2004).
172. Ryan, supra note 11, at 260 (noting that in current desegregation litigation the “end
goal changed from integration to reparation; indeed, a number of these cases have come to
resemble isolated versions of school finance litigation”).
173. Id. The author recommends this type of litigation over desegregation because “some
federal courts have used school desegregation decrees to circumvent the limitations imposed
by Rodriguez or similar state-court decisions rejecting school finance challenges.” Id. at 264.
174. See Kaplin, supra note 153, at 99–100. Kaplin points out that “school finance litigation displaced desegregation litigation as the major instrument for enhancing equal educational opportunity.” Id.
175. See Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, supra note 123, at 1570–71.
Kahlenberg points out that “part of receiving an adequate education is having access to ‘re-
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dle-class schools would increase funding per pupil and cost less to operate.176 Finally, redistricting would provide integrated schools.
Low-income students would reap benefits from working in an environment with middle-income peers.177 Middle-income students bring intangible “educational capital” to the schools they attend.178 Those students and
their parents attract better qualified teachers and higher expectations on
school officials, which have an indirect positive impact on the other students
in those schools.179 Also, students enrolled in middle-class schools are more
likely to have access to college prep classes and an environment with children that have high goals and support.180
Arkansas’s current approach to funding, though it addresses the issue
of poverty, fails on two fronts.181 First, research has shown that spending
money directly on low-income schools does not improve results.182 In states
where inner-city schools were funded at higher amounts than their suburban
counterparts, the inner-city schools continued to score lower on standardized
tests.183 Second, the adequate education reforms do not consider the advantages student integration has on achievement.184 The school districts receive none of the positive byproducts of racial integration.185 For example,
in St. Louis, a study found that when a minority student transferred to a suburban school district, the student consistently performed better than his or
her peers in inner-city schools.186

sources’ provided in mixed-income schools like positive peer influences, active school parent
volunteers, and high-quality teachers who teach a rigorous curriculum. Id.
176. Black, supra note 121, at 410–11.
177. James, supra note 119, at 227.
178. Black, supra note 121, at 409.
179. Id. at 377, 409.
180. Ryan, supra note 11, at 298.
181. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 358 Ark. 137, 142, 189 S.W.3d 1, 4
(2004). Arkansas increased funding to poorer districts and focused on incentives to prevent
teacher migration. Id.
182. See Ryan, supra note 11, at 290 (suggesting that the effects of segregation “cannot
be adequately addressed by school finance reform . . . .”).
183. Id. at 290–91. Ryan details the expenditures of the school district at the heart of the
Missouri decision. The school districts “[h]aving been denied relief that would very likely
have been cheaper and more effective, they were granted a bonanza of funds” to convert to
magnet schools. Id. at 290. While the students saw some improved performance, the students
still failed to improve relative to other students in their states. Id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. Id. at 298–99. Ryan also points out that in a similar San Francisco case study “students from low socioeconomic backgrounds posted significant gains in achievement when
they transferred to schools with more advantaged and higher-achieving students.” The performance was better “despite the fact that the transfer schools received no increase in funding.” Id. at 299.
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Per pupil funding would be more efficient if central Arkansas schools
converted from a system that uses proximity to the school as the sole factor
to one that uses socioeconomic status. Instead of increased funding through
tax hikes, socioeconomic redistricting could better allocate current resources.187 Some states have created financial incentives for accepting lowincome students by using a “weighted student-funding formula.”188 With this
method, schools receive additional funds for accepting low-income students.189 Other states have the school districts compete for transfers by having state funds follow the student to the new district.190 If adopted in Arkansas, the increased funding at the school level would entice better teachers
and improve test results at historically poor schools.191 Additionally, economic incentives have been proven to increase the incentive for school districts to accept low income students.192 Rather than rely on tax increases,
Arkansas could reallocate the $38 million it currently spends in desegregation to fund the redistricting plan.193
Since many lower-income schools are segregated, socioeconomic redistricting would also indirectly increase diversity.194 The neighborhood
school system encourages racial isolation.195 Changing the system will
change the makeup of the school. Low-income students are more likely to
be minority, so integrating low-income students with middle-income ones
would necessarily integrate students by race.196 In addition, over time as
schools improve, wealthier families would have less reason to flee inner-city
schools, and the school districts would stabilize with a middle-class student
body.197
187. See infra notes 189–91 and accompanying text.
188. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, supra note 123, at 1564.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1565.
191. See id. at 1549. Factors that educators find desirable in a school are “high standards,
good teachers, active parents, adequate resources, a safe and orderly environment, and a
stable student and teacher population . . . .” Id. “[M]oney is useful in producing higher test
scores when it purchases teachers with strong literacy skills . . . retains experienced instructors, and increases the number of teachers with advanced degrees.” James, supra note 119, at
223.
192. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, supra note 123, at 1565.
193. See Ryan, supra note 11, at 299–300.
194. Integration is a secondary effect; though the school districts will achieve more integration, the diversity achieved would not be at the same level as plans that concentrate on
racial status. Nelson, supra note 117, at 847.
195. Orfield, Toward an Integrated Future, supra note 165, at 331. Orfield points out that
minority children are isolated into high poverty schools while “[a]lmost no whites end up in
such schools under the neighborhood system.” Id.
196. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, supra note 123, at 1569; see also
Ryan, supra note 11, at 301 (noting that “[b]ecause of the racial dimensions of poverty, a byproduct of racial integration is often (or certainly can be) socioeconomic integration.”).
197. Orfield, Toward an Integrated Future, supra note 165, at 355.
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One district similar to Little Rock has found the socioeconomic redistricting model successful.198 Wake County Public School System is similar
to Little Rock schools in that it was also under a court ordered desegregation
plan.199 Unlike Arkansas, North Carolina actually cut funding from Wake
County’s budget for failure to integrate.200 Wake County schools obtained
unitary status like Little Rock schools and were no longer under a desegregation plan.201 Because the schools were no longer under a court order to
desegregate, Wake County was obligated to use race-neutral plans to maintain any diversity.202 In 1999, Wake County implemented a socioeconomic
status in its assignment plans for all schools.203
The plan was seen as a success and “had been lauded as a national
model.”204 In 2005, Wake County’s low-income and minority students
passed exams at a higher rate than in surrounding traditional school districts.205 That success, however, was short lived. In order to maintain socioeconomically diverse schools, the district had to reassign students often.206
Parents wanted stability and neighborhood schools that would not require
busing students long distances.207 These problems led to the demise of socioeconomic redistricting in Wake County.208
“All things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well
be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes. But all things
are not equal in a system that has been deliberately constructed and maintained to enforce racial segregation.”209 School district boundaries should

198. See infra notes 197–206 and accompanying text.
199. Russo, supra note 37, at 544.
200. Id. at 557 (noting “higher levels of achievement can be attained with less spending”).
201. Id. at 545.
202. Id. at 546. The race-based plans failed under the strict scrutiny analysis. Id.
203. Id. The policy aimed to maintain schools with diverse student populations based on
family income and used free or reduced-price lunches as the criteria. Id.
204. Id. at 543.
205. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, supra note 123, at 1553–54. More
than 63% of Wake County low-income students passed high school end-of-course exams,
versus 47.8% of Mecklenburg County’s low-income students, 51.8% of Forsyth County’s
low-income students, and 48.7% of Durham County’s low-income students—all counties
neighboring Wake County. Id. at 1553–54. African-American students in Wake County similarly out-performed African-American students in the same neighboring counties. Id. at 1554.
206. Russo, supra note 37, at 546–47. This is because “American cities have always been
in a state of constant change.” Orfield, Segregated Housing, supra note 120, at 291.
207. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, supra note 123, at 1559–60.
208. Russo, supra note 37, at 548. The Wake County dismantling sparked outrage among
the public, but was replaced by a “plan that allows families to choose schools close to home
but also permits students who are currently being bused to continue to attend schools outside
of their neighborhood.” Id. at 550.
209. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971).
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evolve with the needs of the community.210 The Seminole County Florida
school district is an example of an adaptable socioeconomic redistricting
plan.211 The school district adopted “‘attendance zones’” that can be modified when a residential area does not provide diversity.212 The school district
allows the school board to change attendance zones and merge large areas,
and allows for socioeconomic transfers as needed.213 With control still invested in the local school board, the Seminole County plan may prove to be
more sustainable than the Wake County plan.214
3.

Garnering Community Support

While the benefits of socioeconomic integration have been acknowledged, communities seem reluctant to redistrict schools. One argument, that
“lasting school integration requires sorting out the links between schools
and housing changes,”215 has prompted some states to address the neighborhood issue on the front end, by enacting legislation that requires portions of
new developments to be set aside for low income households.216 Other districts have opted for public school choice as another alternative to redistricting.
The theory behind school choice is that if schools were allowed to
compete for students, then successful schools would be emulated and all
schools would benefit.217 The problem is that schools do not act like a tradi210. Saiger, supra note 7, at 495–96. Saiger points out that “[s]chool district boundaries,
like the boundaries of electoral districts, should be periodically redrawn. But whereas electoral redistricting periodically restores interdistrict equivalence in population, school redistricting should seek to dissolve within-district accretions of wealth and poverty.” Id.
211. Danielle Holley-Walker, After Unitary Status: Examining Voluntary Integration
Strategies for Southern School Districts, 88 N.C. L. REV. 877, 899 (2010). The school district
may be an ideal model for Pulaski County because of the similarities between the two. Like
Pulaski County school districts, the school is a post unitary school located in central Florida
with a large and diverse student population. Id.
212. Id. at 900.
213. Id.
214. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 742 (1974) (“[L]ocal autonomy has long been
thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public
schools and to quality of the educational process.”).
215. Orfield, Segregated Housing, supra note 120, at 291.”[R]educing residential segregation by economic status will translate into greater socioeconomic integration.” Kahlenberg,
Socioeconomic School Integration, supra note 123, at 1569.
216. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, supra note 123, at 1569.
217. See 2013 Ark. Acts 1227 at sec. 6 (amending ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18227(b)(2)(A)(i) (Repl. 2007 & Supp. 2013)) (“Giving more options to parents and students
with respect to where the students attend public school will increase the responsiveness and
effectiveness of the state’s schools because teachers, administrators, and school board members will have added incentive to satisfy the educational needs of the students who reside in
the district . . . .”).
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tional market.218 School choice provides no mechanism for improvement.219
As the more successful schools attract students, the unsuccessful districts
“become ever more poor and distressed.”220
Additionally, space in schools is limited.221 One proponent of socioeconomic integration has aptly pointed out that “it is patently clear that there
simply are not enough good schools into which students can transfer.”222
School choice laws do not address what happens to the spillover students
when the successful schools reach capacity.223 Finally, school choice would
be an ineffective solution to segregation because school integration would
not be a natural result.224 Parents would still be likely to pick schools based
on status and not educational results.225
With these drawbacks, it becomes apparent that school choice would
be an inadequate plan for Pulaski County schools. As one commenter stated,
“freedom of choice plans were unacceptable if there were other ways, such
as zoning, that were reasonably available and would result in a speedier and
more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial school system.”226
A long term socioeconomic redistricting plan can be implemented successfully in Pulaski County by focusing on efficiency, adaptability, and
community involvement. Redistricting would achieve the most benefit using
the least disruptive method. As this note shows, Pulaski County students
would receive many benefits from redistricting. Like the Seminole County
plan, the local school boards could maintain local control in the redistricting
decisions.
Finally, a key way to combat the pitfalls of parental disagreement is to
involve the community.227 Communities and school districts have worked
218. See Saiger, supra note 7, at 500.
219. See id.
220. Id.
221. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, supra note 123, at 1561 (noting that
in one district “almost 18,000 [students] were unable to transfer because higher-performing
schools were full to capacity.”).
222. Id. at 1565.
223. Kahlenberg, Public School Choice, supra note 147, at 249 (stating it would be “unfair to trap poor kinds in bad schools.”).
224. Saiger, supra note 7, at 500. By competing for residents the school district will work
with local government to bring in residents with “taxable wealth and to exclude those who
are poor and/or expensive to educate.” Id.
225. Gewirtz, supra note 93, at 742 (“Where a choice system is ‘tainted’ in this sense, it
presumptively does not remedy the violation . . . .”); see Black, supra note 121, at 410 (stating that parents choose to enroll their students in middle income schools).
226. Russo, supra note 37, at 537; see Ryan, supra note 11, at 278 (“The effects of racial
and socioeconomic isolation, this Article suggests, cannot be adequately addressed by school
finance reform . . . .”).
227. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall argued that the notion of local school control “simply flies in the face of reality.” Id.
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together in finance litigation in the past,228 demonstrating that it is possible
to garner community support to improve academic achievement. This goal
far outweighs the inconveniences the middle class may suffer through, such
as extended busing.229 As Justice Marshall said in his dissenting opinion in
Milliken, “We deal here with the right of all of our children, whatever their
race, to an equal start in life and to an equal opportunity to reach their full
potential as citizens.”230
IV. CONCLUSION
Arkansas school districts are in a unique position to not only improve
the education of the students, but also to shed its torrid history. Rather than
being a reminder of past wrongs that should not be repeated, Little Rock can
be a shining example for others to emulate. The Supreme Court appears to
be stepping aside in the efforts to integrate, and school districts will now be
asked whether to continue improving in a neutral way or stick with the
status quo. Socioeconomic redistricting plans should be the path taken for
Pulaski County school districts. Redistricting would allow for Pulaski
County to improve academic achievement, eliminate the need to spend tax
dollars in desegregation efforts, and still integrate public schools.
Nikki L. Cox!

at 797. He said, “Centralized state control manifests itself in practice as well as in theory. . . .
The State also establishes standards for teacher certification and teacher tenure; determines
part of the required curriculum; sets the minimum school term; approves bus routes, equipment, and drivers; approves textbooks; and establishes procedures for student discipline.” Id.
at 795–96.
228. Ryan, supra note 11, at 263 (“[T]hese cases often pitted unlikely allies against unusual foes, in that civil rights groups representing school children teamed up with the districts
(against whom the initial desegregation case was brought) in an effort to extract money from
unwilling state governments.”).
229. See Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, supra note 123, at 1560.
230. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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